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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to assess the effect of capital gains taxation
on non—Austrian assets, such as claims to profits of continuing enterprises.
As compared to taxation on an accrual basis, the capital gains tax discourages
sales of appreciated assets. This is the "lock—in" effect. Because assets
subject to capital gains taxation are generally held a long time, conventional
estimates suggest that the effective rate of capital gains taxation is low.
We contend that conventional estimates could seriously underestimate the
effective rate of capital gains taxation because they ignore uncertainty. We
construct a model which allows us to calculate the value of being able to
actively manage a portfolio and use this model to calculate the effective rate
of capital gains taxation. For several plausible parameter values the effective
rate is significantly higher than estimates under certainty. We also discuss
some of the ways in which the lock—in effect may distort the allocation of
investment funds and the efficient workings of the capital market.
Daniel Kovenock Michael Rothschild
Department of Economics Department of Economics, D—008
Purdue University University of California,
Krannert Center, Room 228 San Diego
West Lafayette, IN 47907 La Jolla, CA 92093
I. Introduction
Capital gains taxes are different from most other taxes on capital.
Because they are levied on a realization basis, how much capital gains tax
is paid depends on when an asset is sold not when the capital gain actually
occurred. If you buy an asset for price P(t) at time to and you sell it
at T, your tax (payable at T) is T [P(T) — P(t)] where T is the statutory
rate of capital gains tax. This is true regardless of when the increase in
value took place. That is, the tax depends only on P(t) and P(T); it is
independent of the rest of the price path P(t). If assets appreciate, the
longer you hold an asset the lower the discounted value of taxes paid on
increases in value which took place just after you acquired the asset. In
the United States, if sale of an asset can be put off until death no capital
gains taxes need be paid. Accrual taxation of capital gains would tax
capital gains as they accrue. If capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis,
the effect is to lower the after tax rate of return by a factor equal to the
tax rate. That is, if an asset grows according to
t
P(t) = P(t ) exp I a(s)ds,0
t0
under accrual taxation at rate X, its rate of return at time s will be
c(s)(1—A). Since tax obligations are incurred as capital gains are earned,
if investors pay tax at the same rate, tax burdens are independent of changes
in ownership.
As compared to taxation on an accrual basis, the capital gains tax
discourages sales of appreciated assets. This is called the "lock—in" effect.
Investors who hold assets which have increased in value are locked into these
assets. They can sell them only on pain of paying taxes which could be
deferred or avoided.
Economists have documented that the lock—in effect is real. Feldstein
and Yitzhaki (1978), Feldstein and Sleinrod (1978), and Feldstein, Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (1980) have demonstrated that the holding period for assets subject
to the capital gains tax is sensitive to tax considerations. Bailey (1969)
and more recently Protopapadakis (1983) have found, after examining tax returns,
that on average assets on which capital gains taxes are levied are held for a
long time. Protopapadakis estimates that the average holding period is
between 24 and 31 years.
In a previous paper (Kovenock and Rothschild, 1983) we analyzed the effect
of capital gains taxation on "Austrian" assets, that is, on assets whose real
value depends on when they are harvested or consumed. The standard examples
are wine and trees. We discussed the impact of capital gains taxation on the
harvest time of Austrian assets and on the allocation of investment between
Austrian and non—Austrian assets. In our model, capital gains taxation
decreased the harvest times of some Austrian assets and left unchanged the
harvest times of other Austrian assets. We did, however, find a financial
lock—in effect. The owner of an Austrian asset would never find it profitable
to sell the asset to another investor before the asset was harvested or con-
sumed.
Most assets subject to capital gains taxation are not of the Austrian
type. They represent claims to the profits of continuing enterprises. For
such assets the economic consequences of capital gains taxation are different
and less apparent. In general, taxes on capital can have two kinds of effects
on economic efficiency. First, by reducing the attractiveness of investing,
the capital gains tax can distort the savings consumption decision. Second,
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by making some investments more attractive than others or by interfering with
the efficient operation of the capital market, taxes on capital can cause an
innefficient allocation of the funds which are available for investment.'
Conventional wisdom suggests the first effect is small. Because
appreciated assets are held for a long time, the effective rate of the capital
gains tax is held to be quite low. Protopapadakis puts the effective rate of
capital gains taxation between 3.4% and 6.6% in the period from 1960 to 1978.
This is much less than the statutory rate. For the same period Protopapadakis
reports that the statutory rate which the average dollar of reported capital
gains income faced varied from 18.1% to 27.1%. We will reexamine this
assumption in the next section. There, we contend that conventional estimates
could seriously underestimate the effective rate of capital gains taxation
because they ignore uncertainty.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the consequences of the
lock—in effect on the efficient allocation of capital. We conclude that there
are ways in which the lock—in effect can lead to an inefficient allocation of
capital. However, we believe, without knowing how we would document our
belief, that these effects are small if not insignificant.
We find this problem easiest to think about within the following framework:
Suppose that society has a number of potential investment projects, projects
which can be ranked in terms of their social desirability. Ignoring uncer-
tainty and capital market imperfections, this ranking is equivalent to an
ordering in terms of the rate of return of each project. Capital market
misallocations occur when projects with a high return are deferred while
projects with a low return are undertaken. Thus, our questions are: can the
capital gains tax cause such mistakes and are they likely to be large?
The capital gains tax can cause such misallocations. The tax may make a
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project with high social returns unattractive to the person who will decide
whether the project will be undertaken. Consider, for example, a company
which is largely owned by its founder. Suppose that most of the founder's
wealth is in the stock of the company which shows large (unrealized) capital
gains. As an investor, the founder is anxious to diversify his holdings. He
can do this by selling shares of the company's stock, paying capital gains
taxes, and using the proceeds to buy a diversified portfolio. He can avoid
the capital gains tax by having his company buy the same diversified portfolio.
In an extreme case he can turn his company into a mutual fund. In a less
extreme case he can choose to have his company undertake projects which
diminish the risk of his own portfolio. If there are investment projects
which this company alone can pursue, then there is a potential social loss if
this company does not develop them. Society can diversify the risk; the
company's founder cannot. For this reason, valuable projects are shelved.
It is clear that this problem, which we have labeled the "Steve Jobs problem,"
probably does occur. We doubt that it is very significant. However, we have
no idea how we would demonstrate this.
We note another possible effect of the capital gains tax on market
efficiency. Since the capital gains tax is a transactions tax, it diminishes
trading. If investors get Information from asset prices, reduced trading may
entail investors getting less Information and thus making less good decisions.
We have worked out an example (not reported here) which illustrates this point.
It is difficult to assess the importance of this aspect of the lock—in effect
but we doubt it is very significant.
Other theories of how the capital gains tax can distort the allocation of
investment are less credible. Most stories of how the tax system distorts
investment allocation depend on the favorable (relative to dividends) tax
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treatment of retained earnings rather than the lock—in effect. Because
capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends, companies have an
incentive to retain earnings rather than to pay dividends. The difficulty
this causes is that companies must do something with their retained earnings.
If they invest them in their own projects, and if their own projects have
lower rates of return than the projects of companies which have no retained
earnings, then it may happen that worthy projects go begging while relatively
unprofitable projects receive funding. Again, for this mechanism to cause
misallocations of investment it is necessary that projects be tied specifically
to firms. If all firms can invest in all projects then the financing of
investments by retained earnings cannot by itself cause harm.
Even with this assumption, it is difficult to understand how financing
projects out of retained earnings can lead firms to invest in projects with
below market rates of return. Suppose there is a competitive bond market
which provides funds to companies for investment at a constant cost. If the
rate of interest on bonds is B, then all companies will undertake investments
which promise a rate of return of B or more. Furthermore, if all companies
finance some projects with bonds then the market will operate efficiently.
Marginal projects are financed out of bonds; if all companies are in the bond
market then all are using the same cutoff rate to determine the marginal
investment project. A company with so much retained earnings that the marginal
project can be financed out of retained earnings has a rate of return of B.
To obtain this rate of return, it is not necessary to invest in the bonds of
other companies. An alternative is to buy its own bonds on the open market or to
call outstanding bonds. Thus a competitive bond market ensures that rational
companies will, even when using retained earnings as a primary source of
financing, invest in projects which earn B or more and not invest in projects
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which earn B or less. While the capital gains tax may encourage companies
to retain earnings rather than to pay dividends, this should not lead to
inefficient allocations of investment.
This model is oversimplified. Companies do not all pay the same price for
bonds. Differences in interest rates charged companies have many causes. An
important one is the debt equity ratio. The extent to which companies use the
bond market may increase the rate of interest which they must pay to raise new
funds. The lock—in effect of the capital gains tax may exacerbate differences
in interest rates charged to different companies. The lock—in effect reduces
the incentive to sell the shares of companies with retained earnings. This
nay keep the prices of their shares artificially high relative to what they
would be in a world of accrual taxation. That is, the lock—in effect may cause
share prices to reflect past earnings as well as future expected earnings.
This will raise the value of equity of firms with past (retained) earnings and
lower the cost of bond capital to them. Again, it is hard to know how important
are such deviations from the perfectly competitive model (of the bond market);
we doubt they are significant.
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II. The Effective Rate of Capital Gains Taxation
Suppose you had a million dollars which you didn't need and you decided to
give it to your children on your death which you knew would be in T years.
Rather than letting the money lie idle, you decide to invest it. Mindful of
the tax law, you invest only in assets which pay neither dividends nor interest
but instead reward their owners with capital gains when they are sold. You do
not plan to sell any of the assets which you have put in the portfolio to be
turned over to your children. On your death, the portfolio will be liquidated
and its proceeds will be distributed to your children. In the United States at
least, the capital gains in the portfolio will escape taxation. What then is
the effective rate of capital gains tax which you will pay on the investments
you have undertaken on behalf of your children?
At first glance the answer to this question seems clearly to be: "Zero."
This is certainly the answer which is consistent with the method which most
economists use to calculate the effective rate of capital gains taxation. The
- standard source for such calculations is Bailey (1969) whose procedure is
described below.
"Zero" seems a perfectly reasonable answer if capital gains accrue with
certainty. However, the values of most assets which produce capital gains
evolve in a manner which is highly uncertain. For such assets the effective
rate of capital gains taxation is not zero. Here's why. Consider again the
million dollars you plan to invest to leave to your children. To avoid paying
capital gains taxes, you must not sell any assets which have increased in
value. Suppose, to take an extreme case, that because of inflation all assets
always show a paper gain. Then to avoid paying capital gains taxes, you must
never sell any asset; in other words, you must follow a buy and hold policy.
If there were no capital gains tax (and no other transaction costs) then you
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would not follow a buy and hold policy. You would continually rebalance your
portfolio to maintain the optimal composition of assets. If assets followed a
stationary distribution, you would often want to keep the share of each asset
in the entire portfolio constant. To do this you would have to sell the assets
which had increased in value (relative to the average) and buy those which had
decreased in value. This is the opposite of the rule: "Sell losers and hold
winners" which those who wish to avoid the capital gains tax are urged to
follow. To avoid the capital gains tax, you must give up the privilege of
managing your portfolio. Tax avoidance has a price and this price should be
calculated as part of the effective rate of taxation. With strong assumptions
we can calculate this price and thus the effective rate of capital gains
taxation.
In the remainder of this section we build a model which will allow us to
calculate the value of being able to actively manage a portfolio. We then use
this model to calculate the effective rate of capital gains taxation. We find
that for some parameter values the effective rate is quite high —much higher
than the statutory rate. For others it is very low. The parameters that seem
to matter most are those which describe the level of diversifiable risk.
However, the degree of risk aversion is also important.
Not all economists will find the model and the assumptions we have used
to calculate the effective rate of taxation compelling. We discuss some of the
more serious objections to our procedure in the final part of this section.
a
A. A Model for Calculating the Value of Portfolio Management
Suppose an investor has the opportunity of dividing his wealth among N
assets. Asset returns are correlated; each assets value grows according to
(1) d P. = P. (a d t + (5 d Z. + a d Z) I = 1,,.. ,N.
Where Z, Zl,...,ZN are independent Wiener processes. As we will see a2
represents a common component of undiversifiable variance and (52 represents
uncertainty which can be diversified away. A risk averse investor facing
investment opportunities given by (1) will split his wealth evenly among the
N assets. Suppose he follows a buy and hold policy. After T years his wealth
will be W(T), a random variable whose distribution we now calculate. Let b.(T)
= log P.(T) and b(T) = (bl(T),...,bN(T)). It is straightforward (for details
see Arnold 1974: 141—44) to show that b(T) has a multivarjate normal
distribution with mean
(2) i(T) = T (a - (a2 + (52)12)1
where i is a vector of N ones, and variance covariance matrix
22 2 2 26i-a a a ... a
222 2 2
(3) E(T) = T a (5+a a ... a
2 2 22a a ...
It follows that P(T) (Pl(T),...,PN(T)) has a inultivariate log normal
distribution (Johnson and Kotz 1972: 20) with mean vector
(4) E(P(T)) = eaTt
and variance covariance matrix (T) wfth elements
9
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Suppose W(0) = 1 is the amount initially invested in the portfolio (Under the
assumption, soon to be made, of constant relative risk aversion this is a
N
normalization). Then W(T) = N1 E P.(T), and the mean and variance of a
i=1 1





(7) V[W(T)J = e2aT[N_leT + 0 ) + (1_N)eT0 1I.
If the proceeds of this portfolio are taxed on a realization basis at rate
i, after tax returns are
(8) W(T,T) = W(T) (1—T) + T
with mean and variance
(9) E[W(T,Tfl eaT(l_T) + T
and
(10) V[W(T,T)] = (1—T)2 e2aTN_ eT2 + 02) + (1_N_l)eTG_1).
Now consider how the wealth of the same investor evolves if before tax
asset returns continue to evolve according to (1) but (1) the investor
continually rebalances his portfolio and (ii) assets are taxed on an accrual
basis at rate A. Let Y(T,X) be the value of such a portfolio. Let S(t)
denote the number of shares which the investor holds in asset i; then
N
Y(T,A) = E S. (T) P. CT)
1=1 - 1
and, as Nerton (1971: 378—9) shows,
(11) dY E S. d Pii I
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describes the evolution of the portfolio's value. If the investor is risk
averse, then he will manage his portfolio so as to keep an equal share of
his wealth invested in each asset. Let
S. Ct) P. (t) —1
w (t) = i i • In the optimal portfolio w.(t) = N
Y(t,A) 1
Thus, (11) becomes
(12) dY = E Yw. P.' dP = EP' dP11 1 i i
Accrual taxation changes asset dynamics from (1) to
(13) dP. = (1—X) P. (cdt + dZ. + GdZ ).1 1 1 0
To see this suppose that at t, the vector of holdings of assets is P(t). Let
p(t,t+h) = P(t+h) — P(t); p(t,t+h) is a random vector which depends on t, h,
arid the events which have occurred up to, and including, time t. The meaning
of (1) is essentially that for h small the expected value of p(t,t+h) is
approximately equal to cthP(T) and the variance covariance matrix of p(t,t+h) is
approximately equal to h P(T) EP(T) where P(T) is a diagonal matrix with P(T)
on the diagonal and E is a matrix with 2 + 52 on the diagonal and
elsewhere.
Now suppose there is accrual taxation at rate A; we can approximate the
effect of accrual taxation by considering realization taxation over short time
intervals. If there is a before tax gain of p(t,t+h), then after tax gains
have means approximately equal to P(T) a(1—X)h and variance covariance matrix
approximately equal to h(1-X)2 P(T) Z P(T). But this is the meaning of (13).
Substituting (13) in (12) we see that
(14) dY = Y(1—X) (cdt + adZ + N' E dZ).
Assuming that Y(O,X) 1, the solution to this stochastic differential
equation is (Arnold 1974: 138)
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(15) Y(T,X) = exp[(a(1-X) - (2 + o2)(1-A)2)T + (1-X)(2 + c2)½X]
2N 2 N
where X is a standard normal random variable; that is Y(T,X) is lognormally
distributed with mean
(16) E[Y(T,X)) = e)T
and variance
(17) V[Y(T,X)] = e2 l_X)T[exp((T) (1-X)2(a2 +
As is clear from the formulae (9), (10), (16), and (17) taxation changes
the distribution of returns of the two portfolios we have examined. Taxes
reduce both the mean and variance of returns; however the relative effects of
taxation on the two portfolios are different. Specifically suppose X = t and
compare E{W(T,T)] with E[Y(T,T)]. It is straightforward to calculate that
E[W(T,T)] > E[Y(T,T)] for all TC [0,1] with equality holding only if T 0
or T = 1. Similarly V(W(T,T)) > V(Y(T,r)) for TC [0,1] equality holding if
T = 1 or if N 1 and T = 0. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the mean and variance of
these portfolios as the level of taxation varies for various values of the
parameters. In all the figures a = •, = .039, and N T = 10; in Figure
2, 2 = .038 and in Figure 3, 2 = •• The reasons for choosing these
parameter values are discussed in subsection C below. As is clear from the
figures, taxes reduce mean and variance in each case. Figure 4 shows the
parametric curves giving the means and standard deviations of the two
portfolios as T varies from 0 to 1. In both Figure 4a and 4b,T = 10, a = .1,
=
.039, and = .39; in Figure 4a,N = 1 while in Figure 4b,N = 10. Real-
ization taxation induces a linear trade off between mean and standard deviation;
as T increases the decrease in the standard deviation is proportional to the
decrease in the mean. Under accrual taxation the standard deviation decreases
with the mean at a decreasing rate; standard deviation is a convex function of
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the mean.2 For N = 1 the endpoints of both cues coincide. At low levels of
T accrual taxation provides a more favorable trade off of mean for decreases in
standard deviation, while at high rates of taxation accrual taxation provides a
less favorable trade off of mean for decreases in standard deviation. For N = 10
the right endpoint of the curve for accrual taxation is below the right endpoint
for realization taxation. This reflects the fact that with a zero tax rate both
portfolios have the same mean, while the continually managed portfolio is less
risky.
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B. The Effective Rate of Taxation
In the context of certainty, Bailey (1969) defined the effective rate of
capita? gains taxation as the rate of accrual taxation, A, which would ensure
equality between the following two things: The after tax profits on an
investment subject to capital gains tax on a realization basis at rate T and
the after tax profits on the same investment taxed on an accrual basis at rate
A. With this definition, the effective rate of taxation depends on the
characteristics of the investment, the rate of capital gains taxation and the
length of time the investment is held. If an investment has an instantaneous
rate of return of a(s) and it is held T years, its after tax return is
(18) C = [exp a(s)ds] (1-T) + T.
Taxes levied on an accrual basis reduce the rate of return from a(s) to
cL(s) (1—A). Thus the equivalent accrual rate is the solution to the equation
(19) C = exp a(s) (1-X)ds.
Therefore,
log [ exp a(s)ds (1—T) + T
(20) X(T,T) 1 — _____________________________T
I a(s)ds0
is the formula for the effective rate of taxation as a function of T and T.
Clearly, A(O,T) = 0 and a simple application of L'Hospital's rule gives
A(T,O) = T. It is also straightforward to show that A1. > 0. The effective
rate of capital gains taxation declines with the holding period. To see that
this is so, note that sign — sign f j a(s)ds) where
x
xe (1—T) xf(x) = — log(e (1—T) + T).
eC(1_T) + T
Note that f(0) = 0 and calculate that f'(x) > 0 to conclude that < 0.
Figure 5 graphs the effective rate of taxation as a function of the holding
period T under the assumption that a(s) a = .1 and T = .2.
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We extend this definition in a straightforward way to uncertainty: the
effective rate of taxation is that rate of accrual taxation which makes an
investor indifferent between holding a buy and hold portfolio which is taxed
at rate T and holding a continually managed portfolio which is taxed at accrual
rate A. A definition in terms of indifference is a definition which depands
on preferences. If the investor maximizes expected utility and has utility
function U(s) then the effective rate of taxation is the solution, A(T,T),
to
(21) E[U(W(T,T))] E[U(Y(T,A))].
Having the effective rate of taxation depend on the utility function is
unfortunate but unavoidable. No rate of accrual taxation can make the
distributions of the two random variables W(T,T) and Y(T,A) equal in any
sense. For our calculations we choose a constant relative risk aversion
utility function. We do this both because it makes some calculations tractable
and because it makes the effective rate of taxation independent of the amount
invested.
Let (1—y) be the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Then U(X) =y X'. Let A(T,X) = E[tl(Y(T,X))]= E yY(T,X)'. This is, because of (15),
the moment generating function of a normal random variable. Thus,
(22) A(T,X) = exp[yT(a(1—A) ( + cr2) (1—A)2) + y2(1-X)2( + cY)T].
2N 2 2N 2
Similarly let R(T,T) = EtU(W(T,T))] = 1 E[W(T,T)''], Unfortunately
.Y
R(T,T) does not have such a neat closed form expression. However the value of
R(T,T) for given parameters can be approximated using Monte Carlo methods.
That is let
1
S(T,r;Q) = Q y E (N E (exp (b. (T))(1—t)+ r))'
q=1 i1
where the bq(T) = (b1q(T)• •bNq(T)) are independent realizations of a random
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vector with mean 'i(T) and variance covariarice matrix E(T) as given in
equations (2) and (3). Then
lixn S(T,T;Q) = R(T,T)
Q-+-
and we can estimate X by A(T,T;Q) the solution of
(23) S(T,T;Q) = A(T,X(T,T;Q)).
Because S(T,T;Q) is a sample mean, the central limit theorem states that it is
approximately normal for large values of Q. We estimate the variance of
S(T,T,Q) by
or. N 12





Thus, we can compute an asymptotic 95% confidence interval for X as [),A) where
X and 2 are the solutions of
R(T,T) + 2 (Q) = A(T,A)




In this subsection we discuss the parameters we used to estimate the
effective rate of taxation.
1. a.
We set a, the mean rate of return, equal to .1. Ibbotson and Sinquefield
(1982) report an average rate of return (from 1926 to 1981) of .091 for the
Standard and Poor's 500 and .121 for stocks of small companies — the smallest
(in value) fifth of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
22. .
The annual variance of a portfolio which is completely diversified
(N = ) is
2
V = e2a[e 1).
Arguably this is the annual variance of the market portfolio. Ibbotson
and Sinquefield report V, = .048 from 1926 to 1981. (This is actually the
variance of the value weighted Standard and Poor's 500 and as such it may
understate the variance of returns on a more widely diversified portfolio.
Ibbotson and Sinquefield report a much higher variance (.14) for the returns
of the equities of the smallest one fifth of the companies held on the




The parameter 52 measures the gains from diversification. It is easiest
to express this. as follows. If a portfolio of 10 stocks is held for a year
(and not managed), •the variance of returns is,
2 2 22a c +5 o
V10 = e (.1 e + .9 e -1).
Let h = (V10/V)½_1, h is a measure of the efficacy of diversification or of
the rate at which the benefits of diversification are achieved as more assets
are added to a portfolio; h x 100 is the percentage by which the standard
deviation of a ten stock portfolio exceeds the standard deviation of the
optimally diversified portfolio. If h = .1 then a 10 stock portfolio is only
10% more variable than the optimally diversified portfolio. Clearly h
determines 52 It is easy to calculate that
2
2 2
S = log[10[e —.9 + (h + 1)2(1-e )J].
We are unsure what value of h best describes the opportunities available to
investors; setting h .05 (52 = .038) and 5 (52 = .39) seems to encompass
the range of alternatives.3
4. y.
1—y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The theoretical
literature identifies y = 0 as a pivotal case; the empirical literature produces
estimates of y ranging from .95 to —1000. See Choi and Menzes (1984) for a
compendium of such estimates. With this guidance we felt free to choose y to
suit our purposes. Low values of y correspond to high values of relative risk
aversion. It would seem that high degrees of risk aversion would make the
reduction of risk which can be achieved through active portfolio management more
valuable. This should raise the effective rate of taxation as we have defined it.
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However, high values of relative risk aversion have other consequences for
the calculation of the effective rate of taxation. Our procedure assumes full
loss offsets; the government shares in both gains and losses of investment. As
figures 1 through 4 make clear increasing taxes decreases both the mean and the
variance of returns. If an investor is sufficiently risk averse then his
expected utility can be an increasing function of the rate of taxation. To see
this note that the sign of the effect of an increase in taxation on a contin-
uously rebalanced portfolio is determined by
£ , - -
sign AX = sign jo -I- i—) i—A)I1—y)—cxJ
thus for high values of relative risk aversion expected utility increases as
taxes increase.
Figures 1 through 4 suggest that the sign or RT (which cannot be calculated
directly) is also likely to be positive if y is small. While the possibility
that increasing rates of taxation can increase utility raises many tantalizing
issues, it does confuse the meaning of the phrase "effective rate of taxation."
Thus we have used relatively high values of y (low values of relative risk
aversion) in our calculations: In particular we have chosen y .8 and
=
—.5; in the sequel the first case is described as a low degree of risk
aversion, the second as a high degree of risk aversion.
5. T.
We have chosen values of T ranging from 1 to 30. Protopapadakis (1983)
estimates that assets on which capital gains taxes are assessed are held on the
average between 24 and 31 years.
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6. N.
As explained above N and together calibrate the gains from
diversification and portfolio rebalance. The larger N is, the smaller is the
variance of returns; however, for small N, as N increases so do the benefits
of portfolio management. In the calculations we have chosen N sufficiently
large that AX < 0. It is easy to calculate using (25) that this implies
N > 1 for y = .8 and h = .05. If both diversifiable risk and risk aversion
are high (y = -.5 and h = .5), then we must have N > 15.
7. Q.
Q determines the accuracy of A as an estimate of the effective rate of
taxation. However, the accuracy of the estimate is measured by the size of
the interval [A,X] which is reported along with A. For most of our estimates
we set Q 5000.
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D. Results
The results of our attempts to estimate the effective rate of taxation are
reported in Tables 1 through 8. From these we draw the following conclusions:
1. The effective rate depends on the parameters; it is increasing in
diversifiable risk, risk aversion, and, by and large, the statutory rate. For
low values of these variables the effective rate is negligible. The entries
in Table 1 are not significantly different from zero.4 The effective rates
reported in Table 2 do not differ significantly from effective rates uider
certainty. For high values of these variables, the effective rate can be very
high. The rates reported in Tables 7 and 8 are much higher than the statutory
rate. Such very high rates indicate that a buy and hold policy is not optimal;
if transaction costs other than capital gains taxes are low, then the investor
always has the option of trading often. His effective rate cannot exceed the
statutory rate. Still the very high rates of Tables 7 and 8 illustrate
dramatically that buy and hold policies have costs when investment results are
uncertain.
2. If the statutory tax rate is zero and the level of diversifiable
risk is high, the effective tax rate is greater than zero for most asset
portfolios held 10 years or longer. This is shown in Table 5. The effective
rate is especially high for portfolios with five assets. As Figure 4 demon-
strates, realization taxation offers a different, and on the whole, less
favorable trade off between risk and return than does accrual taxation. For
a one asset portfolio subject to a zero statutory tax rate there is no
difference between buying and holding and continually rebalancing. As the
number of assets in an untaxed portfolio gets large the portfolio variance
under a buy and hold policy approaches that of a policy of continuous management.
This indicates that the effective rate of taxation will be greatest for
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portfolios only partially diversified. This is reflected in the high effective
tax rates for large T and N = 5 in Table 5. It is also evident in Table 3
where diversifiable risk is low but risk aversion is high. Although most
entries in Table 3 .are close to zero, for T > 20 and N = 5 the effective tax
rate is significantly higher.
If the statutory tax rate is 20% and either the level of diversifiable
risk or the level of risk aversion is high, the effective rate of taxation is
higher than in the certainty case for most asset portfolios held 10 years or
longer. In these cases the effective rate does not decline rapidly with the
holding period as it does under certainty. This is demonstrated in Tables
4, 6 and 8. In Table 4, the effective rate does not change much as the holding
period changes. In Table 6, the same appears to be true, except perhaps for
N = 5, where the effective tax rate may increase. In Table 8 the effective
rate increases as the holding period lengthens.
3. In some cases the effective rate of taxation can decrease as the
statutory rate increases. Compare the entries for T > 5 in the high
diversifiable risk — high risk aversion cases of Tables 7 and 8. This is
again a reflection of the fact that increasing taxes may increase utility by
reducing risk. The effective rate of taxation, X('r), is defined as the
solution to the equation





We choose parameters so that < 0. Thus, sign = — sign RT. Thus a
finding that the effective rate of taxation decreases as the statutory tax
rate increases indicates that > 0 > A.
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E. Conclusions and Caveats
The calculations reported above suggest that the effective rate of capital
gains taxation under uncertainty is higher than conventional estimates which
take no account of uncertainty would suggest. Three strong arguments weaken
the force of the case we have made. First as Stiglitz (1983) and
Constantinides (1983) have argued, only fools pay capital gains taxes.5 If tax
liabilities only are considered, the optimal portfolio policy is obviously to
sell losers and keep winners. Stiglitz shows that for every transaction which
violates this rule there is another transaction with the same real and
financial consequences which adheres to the rule. The equivalent tax free
transaction involves options, short sales, or other relatively complex trans—
actions which we feel many investors are unwilling to engage in. We do not
question the logic of the Constantinides — Stiglitz position that capital
gains taxes can be avoided. We believe that many people pay capital gains
taxes even if they could avoid them. The reported responsiveness of sales of
appreciated assets to tax rates is evidence for this position. For people who
could but do not avoid taxes the effective rate of taxation is the effective
rate on the taxes they pay, not on those they could avoid. We believe that
for many people the effective tax rate on capital gains is positive.
A second, and related, argument is that the buy and hold policy which we
have compared to a policy of continual management in order to compute the
effective rate is obviously not the optimal portfolio policy even if options
and short sales are ruled out. If there are no transactions costs other than
capital gains taxes, then the investor has the option of continually managing
his portfolio and paying an effective rate of taxation of 20%. Every entry in
Tables 1 to 8 with a higher effective rate than 20% reflects the return on a
policy, which is dominated by such a policy. However, while the buy and hold
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policy is not the optimal policy we haven't the faintest idea what the optimal
portfolio policy in the presence of capital gains taxes (and possibly other
transaction costs) is. The study of optimal portfolio policy with transactions
costs is in its infancy. Almost the only problem which has been studied is the
simple one of dividing one's portfolio between a risky and a riskiess asset in
the presence of linear transaction costs. For this standard problem
Constantinides (1984b) has done calculations which show that losses from trans-
actions costs may be very small. It is not clear that the relatively few
results on this problem will carry over to the different problem we have
considered. One problem that we have investigated is the problem of dividing
one's portfolio between a riskiess asset and a mutual fund consisting of
shares of each of N assets with returns generated by (13). We assume that the
riskiess asset is subject to the same accrual tax rate as the mutual fund. If
P is the price of the riskiess asset
dP = r(1—X)P dt.0 0
While continuous rebalancing between the riskless asset and the mutual fund is
allowed rebalancing of asset weights within the mutual fund is not allowed.
Using Ibbotson and Sinquefield's (1982) estimate of the average return on
short term U.S. Treasury bills as the riskless rate of return (r = .03) we can
estimate the optimal portfolio shares. With a = .1, c2 = .039, N = 10, and
A = .2 three out of the four possible combinations of values for and y
provided in part C yield portfolio shares for the mutual fund which are
greater than one. The exception is the case of high diversifiable risk and
high risk aversion. In this case .75 of wealth is held in the mutual fund.
If we extend our analysis and assume that rebalancing between the mutual fund
and the riskless asset can only take place periodically, the results of Goldman
(1979) can be used to show that, as the period between rebalancing opportunities
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increases, all of the portfolios examined plunge into the mutual fund of risky
assets. These results seem to indicate that the problem addressed here and
that analyzed by Constantinides are sufficiently different that there is no
reason to suppose that his unimportance result should carry over. For a
sampling of recent work on the transactions costs problem see Constantinides
(1979, 1984b); Kandel and Ross (1983); Taksar, Kiass and Assaf (1983).
Third, we have discussed portfolio choice in a partial equilibrium
context. General equilibrium considerations might make it either unnecessary
or impossible for people to continually rebalance their portfolios. Suppose
for example that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) held. Then all
investors would hold the same, market, portfolio. No one would ever want to
revise his portfolio. An investor who followed a buy and hold policy would
hold an optimally diversified portfolio. Our only response to this is that we
don't believe that anything like the CAPM describes the asset markets of the
United States. Investors have diverse holdings; many do not hold the market
portfolio. For these investors the need to rebalance their holdings through
active management is probably real. Furthermore, our findings that the
effective rate was high depended on the fact that buy and hold portfolios taxed
on a realization basis are riskier than portfolios taxed on an accrual basis as
well as on the advantages of portfolio management.
Thus, despite these arguments, we believe our results are at least weak
evidence for the proposition that the effective rate of capital gains taxation
is higher than the 3 to 7% which, for example, Protopapadakis (1983) reports.
Z5
Footnotes
'Students of reswitching will note that this is an artificial distinction;
it is nonetheless a useful one and we will adopt it.
2The proof of this is tedious and is omitted. It involves inverting
equation (16) to obtain A as a function of the mean, inserting this function
in place of A in the square root of the right hand side of equation (17), and
twice differentiating with respect to the ian. The resulting expression gives
the second derivative of the standard deviation of a portfolio with respect to
the mean, and can be shown to be positive for the relevant range of values of
the mean.
3Evans and Archer (1968) examine how the variability of a portfolio of
randomly selected stocks declines as the number of (equally weighted) assets
held in the portfolio increases. They conclude that their results "raise
doubts concerning the economic justification of increasing portfolio sizes
beyond 10 or so securities." Since Evans and Archer's estimate of undiversifiable
risk differs from ours, it is difficult to compare their measure of relative
variability to the one employed here.
4One of the entries in Table 1 is significantly different from zero at
the .95 level. Our discussion here focuses on the economic significance and
not the statistical significance of our results.
5Th1s conclusion rests on the assumption, made throughout this paper,
that short and long term capital gains are taxed at the same rate. For an
analysis of optimal trading policies with differential taxation of short and
long term gains and losses see Stiglitz (1983) and Constantinides (1984a).
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Estimates of the Effective Rate of Taxation
TABLE 1
Diversifiable Risk —— Low
Risk Aversion -- Low
Statutory Tax Rate —— 0
t7J 1 3 5 10 15 20 25
0.004 —0.006
30
5 0.059 0.013 —0.018 —0.001 0.006 0.001
(+0.068) (+0.040) (+0.032) (+0.024) (+0.020) (+0.019) (+0.022) (+0.017)
(—0.068) (—0.040) (-0.031) (—0.024) (-0.019) (-0.018) (-0.021) (-0.016)
LO 0.022 —0.006 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.003 —0.003 —0.007
(+0.066) (+0.038) (+0.030) (+0.022) (+0.019) (+0.018) (+0.017) (+0.016)
(—0.066) (—0.038) (—0.030) (—0.022) (—0.019) (—0.018) (—0.017) (—0.015)
.5 0.036 0.020 —0.006 —0.003 —0.003 0.004 —0.008 0.005
(+0.063) (+0.037) (+0.029) (+0.022) (+0.018) (+0.017) (+0.015) (+0.014)
(—0.063) (—0.037) (—0.029) (—0.022) (—0.018) (—0.016) (—0.015) (—0.013)
O —0.002 0.030 0.009 0.002 0.021 —0.016 0.000 —0.015
(+0.063) (+0.037) (+0.029) (+0.021) (+0.017) (+0.017) (+0.015) (+0.015)
(—0.063) (—0.037) (—0.028) (—0.021) (—0.017) (—0.017) (—0.015) (—0.015)
Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
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TABLE 2
Diversifiable Risk —— Low
Risk Aversion —- Low
Statutory Tax Rate —— 20%
N/T 1 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 0.161 0.175 0.143 0.134 0.124 0.110 0.090 0.095
(+0.055) (+0.033) (+0.027) (+0.022) (+0.018) (+0.017) (+0.018) (+0.016)
(-0.055) (-0.033) (-0.027) (-0.022) (-0.018) (-0.017) (-0.017) (-0.015)
10 0.201 0.186 0.150 0.135 0.124 0.107 0.084 0.075
(+0.051) (+0.031) (+0.025) (+0.021) (+0.017) (+0.016) (+0.016) (+0.016)
(—0.051) (—0.031) (—0.025) (—0.021) (—0.017) (—0.016) (—0.015) (—0.016)
15 0.196 0.153 0.181 0.169 0.113 0.104 0.086 0.078
(+0.051) (+0.032) (+0.025) (+0.019) (+0.017) (+0.016) (+0.015) (+0.015)
(—0.051) (—0.032) (—0.025) (—0.019) (—0.017) (—0.015) (—0.014) (—0.015)
20 0.221 0.218 0.164 0.158 0.131 0.103 0.098 0.076
(+0.050) (+0.030) (+0.024) (+0.019) (+0.016) (+0.015) (+0.014) (+0.014)
(—0.050) (—0.030) (—0.024) (—0.019) (—0.016) (—0.015) (—0.014) (—0.014)
Effective Rate Under Certainty
.192 .177 .164 .135
J
.113 .095 .081 .070
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TABLE 3
Diversifiable Risk —— Low
Rish Aversion —— High
Statutory Tax Rate —— 0
NIT 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 0.039 0.044 0.039 0.009 0.075 0.068 0.076
(+0.099) (+0.076) (+0.058) (+0.051) (+0.040) (+0.038) (+0.033)
(—0.127) (—0.092) (—0.067) (—0.059) (—0.044) (—0.042) (—0.036)
10 0.039 0.043 0,035 0.012 0.000 0.029 0.045
(+0.084) (+0.066) (+0.049) (+0.041) (+0.037) (+0.033) (+0.029)
(—0.099) (—0.074) (—0.054) (—0.045) (—0.040) (—0.035) (—0.031)
15 —0.103 0.018 0.014 0.022 0.007 0.033 0.023
(+0.097) (+0.064) (+0.047) (+0.039) (+0.036) (+0.031) (÷0.029)
(—0.122) (—0.072) (—0.052) (—0.042) (—0.038) (—0.033) (—0.031)
20 —0.004 —0.013 —0.016 —0.006 —0.024 —0.009 0.011
(+0.081) (+0.065) (+0.047) (+0.038) (+0.035) (+0.031) (+0.028)
(-0.093) (-0.073) (—0.052) (-0.041) (-0.037) (-0.033) (-0.029)
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TABLE 4
Diversifiable Risk —— Low
Risk Aversion —— High
Statutory Tax Rate —— 20%
NIT 1 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 0.163 0.222 0.165 0.199 0.194 0.164 0.172 0.168
(+0.109) (+0.061) (+0.052) (+0.037) (+0.032) (+0.030) (+0.027) (+0.026)
(—0.135) (—0.068) (—0.057) (—0.039) (—0.034) (—0.032) (—0.029) (—0.028)
10 0.177 0.179 0.153 0.201 0.187 0.132 0.172 0.150
(+0.093) (+0.056) (+0.047) (+0.032) (+0.028) (+0.027) (+0.023) (+0.023)
(—0.107) (—0.060) (—0.051) (—0.034) (—0.030) (—0.029) (—0.024) (—0.024)
15 0.177 0.185 0.180 0.158 0.146 0.148 0.136 0.152
(+0.091) (+0.054) (+0.044) (+0.033) (+0.028) (+0.026) (+0.023) (+0.022)
(—0.103) (—0.058) (—0.047) (—0.034) (—0.029) (—0.027) (—0.025) (—0.023)
20 0.258 0.183 0.163 0.161 0.156 0.145 0.142 0.165
(+0.081) (+0.054) (+0.043) (+0.032) (+0.028) (+0.025) (+0.023) (+0.020)
(—0.090) (—0.058) (—0.045) (—0.034) (—0.029) (—0.026) (—0.024) (—0.021)
Effective Rate Under Certainty
F .192
(





Diversifiable Risk —— High
Risk Aversion —— Low
Statutory Tax Rate —- 0
N/T 1 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 —0.041 0.150 —0.028 0.149 0.080 0.182 0.314 0.250
(+0.137) (+0.087) (+0.085) (+0.067) (+0.124) (+0.103) (+0.091) (+0.215)
(—0.141) (—0.088) (—0.085) (—0.065) (—0.115) (—0.094) (—0,081) (—0.157)
10 —0.019 0.049 0.056 0.008 0.159 0.147 0.128 0.188
(+0.101) (+0.068) (+0.057) (+0.063) (+0.059) (+0.081) (+0.164) (+0.145)
(—0.103) (—0.068) (—0.056) (—0.061) (—0.056) (—0.074) (—0.131) (—0.113)
15 0.020 —0.012 0.038 0.100 0.138 0.198 0.241 0.183
(+0.086) (+0.058) (+0.051) (+0.049) (+0.050) (+0.059) (+0.067) (+0.088)
(—0.087) (—0.058) (—0.050) (—0.048) (—0.048) (—0.055) (—0.060) (—0.075)
20
—0.022 0.016 0.036 0.073 0.112 0.108 0.185 0.202
(+0.080) (+0.052) (+0.045) (+0.043) (+0.053) (-1-0.079) (+0.082) (+0.091)
(—0.081) (—0.052) (-.0.044) (—0.042) (—0.051) (—0.072) (—0.072) (—0.076)
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TABLE 6
Diversifiable Risk —— High
Risk Aversion —— Low
Statutory Tax Rate —— 20%
NIT 1 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 0.155 0.143 0.262 0.202 0.236 —0.040 0.265 0.319
(+0.104) (+0.077) (+0.061) (+0.071) (+0.082) (+0.799) (+0.106) (+0.085)
(—0.107) (—0.077) (—0.060) (—0.069) (—0.078) (—0.452) (—0.093) (—0.074:
10 0.236 0.236 0.208 0.296 0.288 0.310 0.246 0.283
(+0.077) (+0.052) (+0.049) (+0.045) (+0.059) (+0.050) (+0.136) (+0.072)
(—0.078) (—0.052) (—0,049) (—0.044) (—0.056) (—0.047) (—0.112) (—0.063)
15 0.187 0.186 0.207 0.193 0.191 0.254 0.211 0.107
(+0.070) (+0.046) (+0.043) (+0.047) (+0.096) (+0.059) (+0.145) (+0.607)
(—0.070) (-0.046) (-0.043) (-0.046) (-0.088) (-0.055) (—0.117) (—0.266)
0 0.150 0.181 0.164 0.188 0.190 0.252 0.181 0.185
(+0.066) (+0.042) (+0.038) (+0.040) (+0.050) (+0.051) (+0.101) (+0.372)
(—0.066) (—0.042) (—0.038) (—0.039) (—0.048) (—0.048) (—0.087) (—0.208)
Effective Rate Under Certainty
I.192 .177 .164 .135 .113 .095 J .081 .070 J
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TABLE 7
Diversifiable Risk —— High
Risk Aversion —— High
Statutory Tax Rate —— 0
N/T 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
15 0.436 0.571 0.814 0.971 1.062 1.123 1.189
(+0.093) (+0.061) (+0.034) (+0.026) (+0.021) (+0.018) (+0.017)
(-0.119) (-0.069) (-0.036) (-0.027) (-0.022) (-0.019) (-0.018)
20 0.333 0.479 0.731 0.875 0.972 1.026 1.104
(+0.096) (+0.064) (+0.036) (+0.027) (+0.021) (+0.019) (+0.017)
(—0.123) (—0.072) (—0.038) (—0.028) (—0.022) (—0.020) (—0.018)
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TABLE 8
Diversifiable Risk —— High
Risk Aversion —— High
Statutory Tax Rate —— 20%
N/T 3 5 10 15 20 25 30
15 0.453 0.521 0.745 0.817 0.913 0.969 1.000
(+0.075) (+0.053) (+0.029) (+0.021) (+0.016) (+0.013) (+0.011)
(—0.089) (—0.059) (—0.030) (—0.022) (—0.017) (—0.013) (—0.011)
20 0.367 0.407
—
0.662 0.773 0.848 0.897 0.954
(+0.074) (+0.056) (+0.029) (+0.021) (+0.017) (+0.014) (+0.011)
(—0.087) (—0.063) (—0.030) (—0.022) (—0.017) (—0.014) (—0.012)
Effective Rate Under Certainty
L.177 J .164 J .135 .113 .095 .081 .070J
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